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Abstract

Pro-social behavior made when buying private goods is becoming increasingly popular. Several findings from behavioral and experimental economics however emphasizes that people are less pro-social in such situations, compared to pro-social decisions in non-market contexts. This paper suggests that emotional responses are important explanations of this finding. It is first argued that the emotional response to a pro-social decision combined with private good purchase is different from the response to a similar decision in a non-market situation. Through evidence from a laboratory experiment, it is then found, that deciding on a social choice in a market exchange involves a less positive emotional reaction to others, compared to non-market situations. Moreover, subjects in market contexts are found to be less responsive to other subjects' contribution behavior, relative to the non-market contexts.

Keywords: Emotions; market exchange; pro-social behavior
PsycINFO classification: 3020; 2360
JEL classification: C92; H41; M14

1. Introduction

Pro-social behavior made in market exchange happens more and more. Examples of market based pro-social behavior exist in great numbers. A few of them are: Starbucks which has a series of coffee products, Starbucks Red, from which a fraction of the price is donated to the Global Fund, a foundation which, among other things, combats HIV/AIDS in Africa (Starbucks 2011). For instance, customers can pay their purchase with an ordinary Starbuck Prepaid card, or with a Starbuck Red prepaid card. The cards are identical, but each time the Starbuck Red Card is used, 5 US cents are donated to the Global Fund. Another example is stamps, which are sold with donations to breast cancer research. In 2008, Post Denmark (Danish National Post Company) ran an initiative called 'Support the Breasts,' and stamps, which were normally priced at 5 DKK (≈ 0.7 €) were priced at 5.5 DKK, with the additional 0.5 DKK being donated to breast cancer treatment research (Post Danmark 2011). A third example is American Express' customers, who earn reward points for using their credit card, which can be redeemed as charity donations (American Express 2011). The British company Body Shop is a fourth example. The company stocks a 'stop sex-trafficking' hand cream in their product range. All the profits raised through the sale of this cream are donated to initiatives against sex-trafficking (The Body Shop 2011). In all of these examples, pro-social behavior occurs in the market place. A consumer buys a private good, but at the same time she/he supports a good cause.

Although pro-social behavior made through market contexts is popular, empirical studies highlight that people act less pro-socially in market contexts as oppose to non-market contexts (Elliott *et al.* 1998, Hoffman *et al.* 1994, Liberman *et al.* 2004, Roth *et al.* 1991). These findings demonstrate that certain contexts foster people to pro-socially act in certain ways. This impact on social decisions is likely to be related to experienced emotions. This paper argues that a better understanding of pro-social behavior in markets and non-markets is attained by considering the emotional reactions that each of these contexts give rise to. The basic idea is that market exchange and pro-social behavior involve two quite distinct decisions: The market decisions promote own benefits, whilst pro-social decisions promote social behavior towards others (Roth *et al.* 1991). The implicit promotion of these two distinct types of motives entails that different emotions are evoked (Bowles 1998, Brandt *et al.* 2009). Consequently, it seems likely that mixing market interaction and social decision making will produce emotional reactions which are different from the ones occurring in situations with merely social decision making.

The aim of the present paper is to test if the emotional effect of acting pro-socially in a market is different from the effect in a non-market context. To do so, a controlled laboratory experiment is carried out. The

experiment compares pro-social behavior in a repeated public good game played in either a treatment in which the public good contributions occur in a market for a private good (market treatment), or a treatment in which the contributions occurs directly with the public good (non-market treatment). The novelty of the experiment is however that the emotions, evoked during the public good game, are measured. Evidence of fourteen positive and negative emotional responses towards the other group members in the public good game are collected. This paper finds that the emotional responses in the market and non-market treatment differ. Compared to the non-market treatment, subjects in the market treatment reacted with more intense negative emotions and less intense positive emotions towards other group members. In both treatments subjects report less negative (more positive) emotions towards group members who are relatively more cooperative than themselves. Similar, relative more positive emotions are reported on subjects who are more cooperative than the other group member. Unlike the non-market treatment, subjects in the market treatment however react less emotionally if other group members' contribute less than themselves. Thus, it is less pleasant to interact on public good provision through markets, and people in the market treatment are less responsive to other group members' behavior.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the experimental design. Section 4 reports and discusses the results and finally section 5 concludes.

2. Hypotheses

The focus of this paper relates to a growing number of studies which underlines the importance of emotional states as key determinants of social decision making. This documentation has been carried out both theoretically (Elster 1998, Loewenstein 2000) and empirically (Ben-Shakhar *et al.* 2007, Bosman *et al.* 2005, Bosman and van Winden 2002, Brandts *et al.* 2009, Cubitt *et al.* 2011, Hopfensitz and Reuben 2009, Kirchsteiger *et al.* 2006, Reuben and van Winden 2008, 2010, van Winden *et al.* 2011).

As already mentioned, the aim of this paper is to study the emotional reaction to the combination of market exchange context and social interaction context. As the motives, and hence the emotional footprints, of market exchange and social interaction are expected to differ (Bowles 1998, Brandt *et al.* 2009), it is an open question what happens when the two of them are combined. A few previous studies are however guiding the hypothesis building.

Brandts *et al.* (2009) studies how combined competition and social exchange relates to emotional states. As competition is an embedded element of market exchange, the insights from Brandts *et al.* are relevant for the present study. In a repeated prisoner's dilemma game, Brandts *et al.* introduced competition by grouping three subjects and let one of them pick only one of the two others as a co-player in the task. The subjects who played the game reported more negative emotions towards one and another, compared to the

same game played without the competitive element. In other words, the combination of competition and social interaction facilitated emotionally more negative outcomes.

This prediction of a relative more negative affective outcome in the combined market exchange and social interaction is supported by a work task experiment of Heyman and Ariely (2004). Participants in this study have to solve a series of tasks (puzzles or a simple real effort tasks). The participants are in different payment schemes. Either they are *not paid*, paid *cash*, or given a *gift* (snack). High effort is observed when participants are in the social interaction pay schemes (not paid, gift of a low value, gift of a high value), or when they are paid high cash amount. Low effort is however observed when a low cash amount is paid out. Thus, giving a low cost gift is much more efficient than paying a low cash amount. Interestingly, these authors also find that mixing market exchange (cash payment) and social interaction (gifts) produces outcomes which are equal to that of the market exchange. These findings therefore suggest that the motive of the market exchange overrules those of the social interaction, and that these affected motives affect behavior.

Based on the studies reported here, and on the research generally documenting the importance of emotional reactions in different domains, it is conjectured that the competitive environment associated with the market provided public good contributions activates relatively more negative emotions, compared to the emotions activated when contributions are occurring in merely a social interaction.

The repeated public good game played in the present experiment is the engine of studying emotional reactions to cooperation in non-market and in market contexts. Although it is not the main focus of the paper, an expectation on the cooperation level in these two contributions contexts is however formed. Theoretically there are contrasting views on this question. Besley and Ghatak (2007), and Kotchen (2006) predict that the market context will have no effect on contributions relative to non-market contexts. Their basic argument is that given a sufficient level of competition and preferences for public good support, the market will provide the contribution (and private goods) that the buyers prefer. Hence, the market provided social support will mimic the contributions that the same people would have chosen out of the market context. In opposition to this view, a couple of behavioral economic theories predict that the cooperative outcome in a market and non-market contexts will be dissimilar. Holländer (1990) argues that people enjoy social approval in their interaction with each other, but that such social approval is less present in markets. Bowles (1998) expects different behavior because market contexts promote self-regarding behavior, not because people become egoistic, but rather because markets make individual's focus on the self-serving parts of their preferences.

Whereas the theoretical discussion is ambiguous, the empirical evidence is clearer (Elliott *et al.* 1998, Heymand and Ariely 2004, Hoffman *et al.* 1994, Liberman *et al.* 2004, Roth *et al.* 1991). Roth *et al.* (1991) find that a competition version of the ultimatum game results in less even distribution of income compared to the distribution observed in the game without the competitive element. A parallel effect is observed in studies, which analyze the impact of market framing. Hoffman *et al.* (1994) framed both the ultimatum and the dictator game as either ‘divide \$10,’ or as ‘exchange’ and observed a significantly smaller level of offers in both types of games when framed as exchange. Elliott *et al.* (1998) find that business versus cooperation induced framing greatly influences the magnitude of cooperative behavior observed in a repeated public good game. Liberman *et al.* (2004) find a similar result by framing a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game as either the Wall Street game or the Community game. Subjects in the Wall Street game were significantly less cooperative. The substantial empirical evidence and the clear behavioral economic predictions, lead me to hypothesize that market contexts fosters smaller public good contributions than non-market contexts.

3. Experimental design

The applied laboratory experiment falls in two parts. When entering the laboratory, subjects receive instructions on the first part straight away and are told that they will receive instructions on the second part on completion of part one. In both parts of the experiment, earnings are measured in points, which are converted into DDK at the end of the experiment in accordance with an exchange rate of 30 points equaling 1 DKK ($\approx 0.134\text{€}$).

The first part of the experiment is a one-shot public good game. The second part is more extensive: First the subjects play a repeated public good game and afterwards they report their emotions towards their co-players in the repeated public good game. The overall structure of the experiment is listed in table 1.

Table 1: Overview of experimental design

	Market treatment	Non-market treatment
Part 1:	One-shot public good game	One-shot public good game
Part 2:	Repeated public good game <i>via market place</i>	Repeated public good game
	Self-reported emotions	Self-reported emotions

The subjects are randomly allocated to two treatments, which differ only with respect to the repeated public good game in part 2. In one treatment, the public good game is played via a market place (market treatment), whereas the other subjects play the game in a non-market treatment which does not involve a market context. The details about each of the tests in part 1 and 2 is thoroughly outlined below.

One-shot public good game. When seated, subjects read the instructions (reprinted in the appendix document) and are asked a series of control questions (available in the appendix document) before the game begins. The questions test that they have read the instructions and that they are able to calculate how income is determined in the game. The experiment begins once everyone has answered correctly. The game is played in groups of 3 subjects (I call the individual subject for “subject i ”, and his co-players for respectively “subject j ” and “subject k ”). The game decision is binary: Subjects either contribute or not¹. The binary decision, rather than the traditional continuous decision from 0 to 20, is chosen because the focus of this paper is on the affective consequences of cooperation. The income (π_i) from this game is determined in accordance with equation 1:

$$\pi_i = E - g_i + \varepsilon \cdot \sum_{h=i,j,k} g_h \quad (1)$$

The contribution (g_i) is 100 points. If the contribution is chosen, the 100 points are deducted from an initial endowment (E) of 280 points, which is given to each of the subjects. The marginal per capita return (ε) is 0.6. This means that all subjects, including the contributor, receive a return of 60 points for each public good contribution. Hence, the total income in this game is calculated as the endowment (E) minus any contribution (g_i) plus the return of the public good ($\varepsilon \cdot \sum_{h=i,j,k} g_h$).

When all subjects have made their decisions, the income is calculated. In order not to influence part 2 behavior, subjects are thoroughly explained in the part 1 instructions that they will only learn this income at the very end of the experiment.

I included the one shot public good game in the experiment to control for subjects’ initial cooperative attitude when they entered the laboratory. The results from this initial test are used to validate behavior in the subsequent game, see the results in section 4.

Repeated public good game. The second part begins with the repeated public good game. A repeated game was chosen in order to facilitate learning in the market treatment. The concern was that this treatment, which is a bit more complicated than the standard treatment, would require some repetition before the subjects completely understood the setup (more on the difference below).

For this game, the subjects are given a new set of instructions and are again asked to answer control questions (see both in appendix document). In the instructions, it is clearly emphasized that the groups are

¹ As the choice is binary, the public good game is a three person prisoner’s dilemma.

reformed in the second part of the experiment. The subjects remain in the same group throughout the second part of the experiment (partner matching). In both treatments, subjects' income is calculated in accordance with equation 1, and therefore income determinations across treatments are isomorphic. Further details of the repeated game are presented treatment by treatment.

The design of the *non-market treatment* is quite close to that of part 1. All game parameters are the same. The only difference is that now the game is repeated for 10 periods. After each period, the subjects receive feedback on their own and others' contributions in the current period. In period 1, subjects are asked, in an incentivized way, to indicate if they expect the other two group members to cooperate².

The *market treatment* also implements a 10 period repeated public good game parallel to that of the non-market treatment. Now, however, the 3 players of the public good game are buyers in a market place through which they have to make their contributions. In the market place, a hypothetical private good is traded. Thus, the subjects do not contribute, but pay for a private good which can contain a contribution. The private good is always the same, and is worth 100 points to the buyers. The private good is either sold with, or without a 100 point contribution to a public good. For each private good bought with a contribution of 100 points, each of the buyers receives 60 points in return for the public good (marginal per capita return (ϵ) is 0.6). Their income is determined in accordance with equation 1. The private good price is parallel to the direct contribution (g_i) in the non-market treatment. As the price contains both the cost of the contribution and the cost of the private good (which is 100 points)³, the endowment of the subjects in the market treatment is 380 points, 100 points more than in the non-market treatment. This keeps the parameters constant across treatments.

The price that the buyers are charged for the private good (with or without the public good) is determined on the selling side of the market place. The selling side is staffed by 4 subjects who take the role of sellers throughout the repeated game. Each seller offers a price for the private good with the contribution, and a price for the private good without the contribution. They are allowed to choose prices which, in the first case, range from 200 to 500 points whereas and in the second, range from 100 to 500 points. One unit of the private good costs 100 points, whilst the public good contributions also cost 100 points. The allowed price ranges implies that the sellers cannot make a loss on any transactions, and that the buyers defray all costs of the contributions and private goods. Furthermore, the sellers have production on demand technology, and each of them can serve the entire market. For each unit of the private good actually sold,

² The expectation measure is only done once and is unannounced in order to avoid subjects aligning behavior and expectation.

³ The cost of the private good is per design paid by the buyers (see more detail in description of the sellers' income.)

a transaction fee is paid, which is 50 points. Thus, all in all, the sellers' income is determined by the offered price minus costs plus the fee, multiplied by the number of transactions.

At the end of each period of the repeated game, the buyers receive feedback about their own and others' contributions (and the price paid) provided through exchange with the sellers. In period 1, before the feedback, the buyers are asked to state if they expect the other two group members to cooperate. After each period, the sellers' feedback informs them as to how all the sellers traded and how profitable the transactions were.

The non-market and market treatments are constructed in an isomorphic manner. The players in the repeated public good game (in the market treatment that is the three buyers) face the same decisions and incentives in both treatments. However, this isomorphic approach is only achieved if the sellers in the market treatment offer the private good at a price, which is equal to cost. Compliance with this central assumption of comparability seeks to be satisfied by a highly competitive environment on the seller side of the market. Hence, it is most likely that trading prices will equal costs. If this is actually true, the cost of a contribution will be the same in the two treatments. The assumption was in fact met in the experiment. Further details on this issue are discussed in the section 4.

In real life decisions, the difference between pro-social behavior in a market exchange and in a non-market setting built on many factors. For instance, buying pro-social product might serve as a social **signaling** (Gneezy *et al.* 2010). You might want to exhibit goodness to non-anonymous fellow shoppers, or to friends coming to your house. Yet, such motives might not be as important when making non-market pro-social decisions. Consider for instance the Starbucks example from above. The donations to the Global Fund might send a good signal to others when you buy the coffee. Had you instead made an online donation to the Global Fund, the donation probably had less social signal value. Like social signaling, **image motivation** (Benabou & Tirole 2006) could also motivate more pro-social behavior through market settings. The argument is, if image concerns motivate behavior, more pro-social behavior could be observed in markets, as donation in this setting creates more exposure and attention by others.

A real-life aspect which might also affect the difference between pro-social behavior in market and non-market setting is the **competitiveness** of the market context. In the experiment a highly competitive and homogenous market for private good with public good contributions is maintained. In reality, companies might attach donations to their products to reach a certain group of consumers and by doing this they enhance product differentiation, and as such they decrease competitiveness of the market. More widespread product differentiation is often associated with higher consumer prices, and hence this is an argument against market provided cooperation.

Accessibility is also an element which potentially can be important to the difference between pro-social behaviors in market and non-markets. It might be easier to come across a donation option in a market, rather than outside a market. For instance, most people frequently go to supermarkets etc. where they can buy a private good combined with a donation. However, websites for good causes are visited less frequently. Thus, the point is that a potential advantage of cooperation through market interaction is its better accessibility.

Whilst acknowledging the importance of these many factors which potentially can influence the comparison of pro-social behavior in market and non-market settings, the present paper *exclusively* studies the affective effect of supporting good causes through the market context *per se* and excludes (by design) the influence of all other factors.

Self-reported emotions. On completion of the repeated public good game, subjects are asked to report their emotions. In parallel with Cubitt *et al.* (2011) and Reuben & van Winden (2008), the subjects report affective response to both of the other players in their group. Thus, in terms of the formal notation, subject i 's emotions towards subject j and subject k (i.e. the other group members) are measured.

The subjects who were sellers in the market did not participate in this phase of the experiment. All participating subjects received instructions on their computer screen and were encouraged to ask the experimenter if anything was unclear to them (See screenshot of the emotion measure in the appendix document).

In the decision screen, the subjects were shown a list of fourteen different positive and negative emotions. Each subject was asked to indicate how intensely she/he experienced each of the listed emotions towards the two other group members (subject j and subject k). Thus, each subject indicated fourteen types of experienced emotions for both of the two other group members.

The intensity of the emotion could be indicated on a scale from 0 to 7, where a higher number corresponds to a greater intensity of the emotion. The list of emotions comprised the following: warmth, anger, fear, envy, sadness, happiness, shame, irritation, contempt, guilt, joy, jealousy, surprise, and disappointment. The sequence of the positive and negative emotions was mixed in order not to make the measure suggestive. On top of the list of emotions, the decision screen also contains information on the average cooperation of each of the other group members. Thus, subject i saw cooperation rate of subject j and subject k , and would then indicate the intensity of all fourteen emotions felt toward each of them. The inclusion of the cooperation rates is meant to facilitate that the emotion reporting subject can

administrate the emotional relation to both co-players in the public good game. The concrete choice of measured emotions and the design of the emotion decision screen follow from Cubitt *et al.* (2011).

As mentioned in the previous section, self-reported emotional measures are a widely used method in experimental economics to understand the underpinnings of pro-social behavior (For instance Brandts *et al.* 2009, Cubitt *et al.* 2011, Hopfensitz & Reuben 2009, Reuben & van Winden 2008, 2010, van Winden & Bosman 2002, and van Winden *et al.* 2011). Whereas this technique seems to have been accepted by many, some scholars remain skeptical, and would favor incentivized measures of true decisions rather than self-reported evidence. Although I sympathize with the idea of incentivized behavioral evidence, no such possibilities exist for the affective footprint of social interactions as these, by nature, are subjective and cannot be made subject for an income calculation. The self-reported measures are therefore used. I am comfortable in this choice as a couple of previous studies have justified that self-reported emotions are in fact good measures of the subjects' emotional reactions to social interaction. Ben-Shakhar *et al.* (2007) studied the one-shot power-to-take game, and related behavior in this game to self-reported emotions and skin-conductance (a physical marker of arousal). Interestingly, the authors find a positive relation between self-reported anger and skin-conductance, hence suggesting that the self-reported (at least of anger) captures the negative experience of arousal. A similar type of evidence is found by Takahashi *et al.* (2004) who link pro-social emotions to certain theory of mind brain circuits. Furthermore, Cubitt *et al.* (2011) report that self-reported emotions relate to behavior in a one-shot public good game, in the same way as punishment points imposed on co-players. Their findings therefore document that a well established incentivized behavioral measure (punishment) of dissatisfaction with the interaction partners' behavior, works in the same (opposite) way as self-reported negative (positive) emotions.

It is intended, that the emotion measures capture the feelings resulting from interaction in the repeated public good game. Although I recognize that emotions potentially are important explanations of cooperation dynamics in repeated public good games, I am in this study merely interested in measuring how subjects felt about the people they interacted with, once the interaction is completed. The experimental design facilitates this focus in several ways. First, subjects were asked how they felt right after the last period of the repeated public good game. Second, they did not know about the emotion measurement, before completion of the repeated game. Third, in the emotion indication screen, it was summarized how cooperative each of the other group members were in the repeated public good game. Four, the instructions explicitly ask subjects to report the emotions towards the other players when they saw how cooperative they were in the interactions. For these reasons, I comfortably trust that subjects reported how they felt at this moment of time, and did not tried to memories specific affective states experience during the course of the game. Obviously, this does not imply that the reported emotions are

not affected by such emotions experience during the game, I am just very careful to measure their emotions felt at completion of the interaction.

4. Results

The experiment was conducted in the Laboratory for Experimental Economics at the University of Copenhagen in November 2008 and April 2011. The subjects were all freshman economics students who had just started their university studies, and participation in the experiment was a mandatory part of their course work. This recruitment procedure ensures no selection bias into the experiment. As the students had just started their education, the fact that they were studying economics does not affect the results.

140 subjects participated in 11 sessions, which took on average slightly longer than one hour. Even though the subjects were required to participate in the experiment as part of their education, they were also provided with solid economic incentives. On average they earned 114 DDK ($\approx 15\text{€}$). 42 subjects participated in the non-market treatment, whereas 98 subjects took part in the market treatment. The latter number includes 56 subjects who were sellers in the repeated public good game. Unfortunately, two groups in the market treatment experienced a serious computer problem, in particular regarding the feedback about the other group members' behavior. The subjects who experienced the computer problems are not used in the analysis, in order to ensure that only completely trustworthy observations form the basis of the study.

The *self-reported emotions* are obtained right at the end of the repeated public good game. The emotion measures allow insights regarding the affective consequences of the cooperation in market and non-market contexts. Notice that each subject (except those who had the role of seller in the market treatment) indicates their emotions towards two co-players, hence two observations per subject is obtained. Thus, the non-market treatment has 84 sets of emotion observations, whereas the market treatment has 72 sets, giving 156 sets of observations in total.

To judge the emotional effects of supporting the public good through the two experimental treatments, an order probit regression is carried out on all fourteen types of reported emotions. I decided to estimate the order probit model as the dependent variables, the reported emotions, can be ranked from low to high emotional intensity in a meaningful way. The results of these estimations are listed in Table 2. To explain the reported emotions, subject j 's (the subject towards whom the emotions in question is directed to) deviation from the emotion reporting subjects' (subject i) average contribution, is included in the analysis. In order to allow negative and positive deviations to affect differently, a separate variable is included for positive and negative deviations. Furthermore, the analysis also accounts for the cooperativeness of the target subject (subject j) relative to the third subject in the group (subject k). Finally, but very central for

the story of the paper, the impact of the treatment is also considered. This is done by including a dummy for the treatment, which account for level difference in the reported emotions across treatments.

Furthermore, the analysis also allows positive and negative deviations of subject j 's average cooperation to affect differently in the two treatments.

Table 2- Ordered probit regressions estimating the fourteen specific emotions on cooperation behavior

Dependent variable:	Positive emotions			Negative emotions								Overall explanation of estimation not different from zero		
	warmth	happiness	joy	anger	sadness	Disappoint- ment	irritation	contempt	guilt	jealousy	surprise	shame	fear	envy
Subject <i>j</i> 's positive deviation from reporting subject's (subject <i>i</i>) average contribution	2.091** (0,92)	1,261 (0,94)	1.599* (0,92)	-1.618** (0,75)	-1,512 (0,96)	-2.451*** (0,87)	-1.531** (0,68)	0,002 (0,62)	-0,522 (0,90)	-1,374 (1,01)	-0,401 (0,89)	-0,702 (0,96)	-0,696 (0,77)	-0,267 (0,82)
Subject <i>j</i> 's negative deviation from reporting subject's (subject <i>i</i>) average contribution	0,186 (0,75)	-1,019 (0,83)	-0,534 (0,90)	0,312 (1,01)	0,544 (1,24)	0,840 (0,90)	0,257 (0,79)	1,313 (0,84)	-1,265 (1,28)	0,962 (1,00)	1,209 (0,89)	0,518 (1,02)	-0,388 (0,90)	-0,245 (1,00)
Subject <i>j</i> 's deviation from subject <i>k</i> 's average contribution	0.721** (0,29)	0,442 (0,30)	0.733* (0,38)	-0.633* (0,34)	-0,378 (0,34)	-0,211 (0,36)	-0.812** (0,39)	-0,335 (0,30)	0,303 (0,32)	-0,438 (0,39)	0.623* (0,34)	0,411 (0,36)	-0,287 (0,30)	-0.682** (0,33)
Treatment (1: Non-market, 0:market)	0.905*** (0,31)	0,454 (0,32)	0.632* (0,32)	0,108 (0,31)	-0.757** (0,35)	-0.701** (0,34)	-0,478 (0,30)	-0,061 (0,33)	0,093 (0,31)	0,144 (0,32)	-0.643** (0,32)	-0,152 (0,32)	0,259 (0,34)	-0,199 (0,35)
Treatment x Subject <i>j</i> 's positive deviation from reporting subject's (subject <i>i</i>) average contribution	-2.597** (1,15)	-1,129 (1,25)	-1,708 (1,11)	-0,180 (1,44)	3.099*** (1,17)	1,994 (1,38)	0,104 (1,18)	-0,328 (1,05)	0,533 (1,09)	-0,499 (1,48)	2.114* (1,15)	1,183 (1,10)	0,269 (1,13)	-0,064 (1,22)
Treatment x Subject <i>j</i> 's negative deviation from reporting subject's (subject <i>i</i>) average contribution	-2.532* (1,30)	-1,392 (1,27)	-1,482 (1,29)	-0,680 (1,35)	2.520* (1,43)	2.537* (1,31)	2.986** (1,36)	0,483 (1,26)	-0,718 (1,60)	-0,899 (1,22)	1,742 (1,09)	1,378 (1,27)	-0,154 (1,14)	0,283 (1,19)
Observations	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156
Pseudo r2	0,057	0,051	0,056	0,041	0,055	0,083	0,099	0,035	0,028	0,043	0,050	0,024	0,012	0,017
LR chi2(6)	26,47	26,71	30,17	18,85	24,14	37,21	38,14	18,49	12,8	14,45	25,34	9,965	5,807	10,18
Prob>chi2	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,004	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,005	0,046	0,025	0,000	0,126	0,445	0,117

Note: Ordered probit estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
clustered on individuals

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results of the fourteen regressions are organized in three clusters, respectively the positive, the negative emotions, and the regressions where it cannot be rejected that together the explanatory variables do not explain anything. The first finding is that the reported positive emotions (warmth and joy) are significantly higher, and the reported negative emotions (anger, sadness, disappointment, and irritation) are significantly lower, if subject j cooperates more than the reporting subject i . In the same vein, higher positive emotions (warmth and joy), and lower negative emotions (anger and irritation) are reported when subject j is relatively more cooperative than subject k . Thus, in terms of emotions, the reporting subject i , rewards subject j both if he is more cooperative than himself but also if he is more cooperative than the third member of the group. Notice, that for surprise (which is listed in the negative cluster) the relation is the reverse. This is however quite intuitive that higher intensity of surprise is reported when one of the co-players is more cooperative than the other one, since the reporting subject had no a priori reason to expect that the co-players differed in their degree of cooperativeness. These findings, complements Cubitt *et al.* (2011) who report similar relation between self-reported emotions and cooperation behavior in a one-shot public good game.

The second finding is that the treatments also affected the emotional response towards the co-players. Generally, subjects in the non-market treatment reported significantly more positive emotions (warmth and joy) and significantly less negative emotions (sadness, disappointment, and surprise). Thus, it appears to have been an emotional more pleasant experience to interaction in the repeated public good game played in the non-market treatment compared to the market treatment.

The third finding of the regressions is that on top of the level difference, the experienced emotions in the two treatments are also related differently to the behavior of the other group members. In the market treatment, positive deviation of subject j 's (the subject towards whom the emotions is targeted) average contribution compared to subject i 's (the emotion reporting subject) average cooperation is related to higher experience of warmth. In the non-market such relation does not exist, but negative deviation is however associated with significantly less warmth. Thus, the reported emotion of warmth seems to be subject to different default behavior. In the market, subjects reward relative more cooperative co-players, whereas relative uncooperative subjects in the non-market are punished, emotion wise. Among the negative emotions, the association to others' behavior is also affected by the treatments (true for sadness, disappointment, irritation, and surprise). Unlike the non-market treatment, subjects in the market treatment react with less intensity of disappointment and irritation towards group members who contribute less than themselves, and report less surprise if other group members contribute more. In other words, subjects in the market context are more emotional immune to the behavior of others.

Surprisingly, subjects in the nonmarket treatment, but not those in the market treatment, report higher sadness if others contribute more. One interpretation of this seemingly unintuitive result, is that subjects in the nonmarket treatment understand the sadness measure, as sadness over own behavior. They are displeased with their own behavior.

The ‘one by one’ analysis of the fourteen emotions reported in table 2 provides interesting insights as to how subjects felt about their interaction partners and how this is affected by their behavior and the treatments. A common approach to draw generally conclusions across all the emotions, is to aggregate the evidence by means of a factor analysis (Brandts *et al.* 2009, Hopfensitz & Reuben 2009, Reuben & van Winden 2010, van Winden *et al.* 2008). Thus, to verify the findings made on the ordered probit regressions, I estimated a principal factor analysis on all of the emotion results, and analyze the resulting factors in the same way as in table 2. The outcome of the factor analysis is reported in table 3.

Table 3- Factors summarizing the affective response about co-players in the repeated public good game

	Factor1	Factor2
Explained variance	0,59	0,32
<i>Factor loading:</i>		
Warmth	-0,78	0,01
Anger	0,64	0,40
Fear	0,03	0,59
Envy	0,16	0,58
Sadness	0,58	0,40
Happiness	-0,90	0,10
Shame	0,09	0,52
Irritation	0,83	0,31
Contempt	0,58	0,44
Guilt	-0,24	0,51
Joy	-0,90	0,10
Jealousy	0,23	0,63
Surprise	-0,09	0,38
Disappointment	0,74	0,40

Note: The factor analysis have applied ortogonal variamax rotation. Alternative rotation commands resulted in similar results. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is 0.85

The fourteen emotions load into several factors, but merely two factors come out of the analysis with an eigenvalue above 1, and only these factors are considered in the following analysis. The loading of the emotions on these two factors are reported in Table 3. The first factor captures the positive – negative aspect of the emotion measures. A high value of factor 1 represents experience of negative emotions, whereas a low factor 1 value stands for positive emotional reactions.

The second factor mainly captures fear, envy, shame, guilt and jealousy. I suggest that this grouping of emotions represent (dis)satisfaction on the pro-social interaction. In relation to this interpretation, Bowles and Gintis (2005, pp. 339) write that “An emotion is prosocial if it induces an agent to act in ways that increase the average payoff to other members a group to which the agent belongs”. The emotions loading high on factor 2, all captures the success of the social interactions. For instance, I may feel that I gave to little and hence report guilt. In contrast, the emotions loading high on factor 1 do not necessary relate to the prosocial success.

I use the two factors to judge if the conclusions made on the order probit regressions in table 2 can be confirmed with the aggregated data. To do so, I run, for each factor, an OLS regression with the same explanatory variables as in table 2.

Table 4- OLS regressions explaining the association between emotion factors and cooperation in the repeated public good game

Dependent variable:	Factor 1	Factor 2
Player <i>j</i> 's positive deviation from reporting player (player <i>i</i>)	-1.455** (0,55)	-0,544 (0,60)
Player <i>j</i> 's negative deviation from reporting player (player <i>i</i>)	0,574 (0,60)	0,414 (0,91)
Player <i>k</i> 's deviation from reporting player (player <i>i</i>)	-0.602** (0,27)	-0,112 (0,12)
Frame (1: Non-market, 0:market)	-0.499** (0,18)	0,011 (0,23)
Frame x Player <i>j</i> 's positive deviation from reporting player (player <i>i</i>)	1,176 (0,72)	0,549 (0,61)
Frame x Player <i>j</i> 's negative deviation from reporting player (player <i>i</i>)	1.326* (0,65)	0,169 (0,92)
Constant	0,208 (0,16)	-0,038 (0,21)
Observations	156	156
R-squared	0,25	0,03
F-test	17,48	3,986
Prob>F	0,00	0,03

Note: Ordinary least square estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on sessions.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The conclusions on the positive and negative emotions made in relation to table 2, is rediscovered in the OLS analysis of factor 1. More cooperation by the target subjects (Subject *j*), relative to both the reporting subject (Subject *i*) and the other group member (Subject *k*), is associated with significantly lower scores of factor 1 (meaning less negative or more positive emotion). Like the conclusions based on table 2, factor 1 is also significantly lower for subjects in the non-market treatment, implying a greater relative level of positive emotions. Furthermore, negative deviations between subject *i*'s and subject *j*'s average contribution, significantly increases factor 1 for subjects in the non-market treatment, but not for those in the market treatment. For factor 2, none of these relations exist.

In sum, both when accessed 'one by one' and aggregately does the analysis of the reported emotions find that higher positive (lower negative) emotions are reported towards group members who cooperate more than the reporting subject, and more than the third group member. Furthermore, it is found that emotions are relatively more negative in the market treatment, but also that, oppose to subjects in the nonmarket

treatment, negative deviations in cooperation between the reporting and target subject does not have affective consequences.

Whereas the conclusion of the emotional impact is clear, the data cannot document why this effect occurs. My preferred interpretation of the findings is however that, different norms play a key role. As emphasized in the introduction section, market decisions and social decision making seem to involve quite diverse motives. Market contexts tend to endorse self-severing behavior whereas social-decision making (in non-market contexts) tend to endorse pro-social behavior. In other words, the two types of decisions seem to apply diverse social norms. But, what is the norm when the two are combined? The study of Heyman and Ariely (2004) suggest that the norm of being kind in social decision making is overruled, when mixed with the market exchange norm. Such phenomena is compatible with the present findings.

The **cooperation** resulting from the repeated public good game is shown in Figure 1. As seen, the contributions in the market and non-market market treatments are almost identical, and exhibit the same dynamics over time. The graphical impression is confirmed by a non-parametric two sided Mann-Whitney test ($z=0.383$, $p=0.7017$), which clearly fails to reject that the individual mean of contributions over all periods of part 2 differ across the treatments⁴.

⁴ The test statistics do not change if group observations rather than individual observations are considered.




Figure 1: Average cooperation rate period by period in part 2, divided into treatments.

At this point, it is clear that the evidence of the repeated public good game contradicts the prediction stated above, but confirms the theoretical no-effect prediction (emphasized by Besley & Ghatak 2007, Kotchen 2006).

Like cooperation in part 2 nor does the cooperation attitude (the one-shot public good game) measured in part 1 differ across the treatments. Average contribution rate was 43% in non-market treatment as oppose to 51% in the market treatment, and this difference is not significant (A Pearsons chi-square test, $\chi^2(1)=1.86$, $p=0.173$). This finding is however not surprising, as the part 1 test measures subjects' initial attitude towards cooperation, an attitude is not influenced by any of the other tests in the experiment.

In order to formally evaluate the cooperation behavior and the relation to the initial cooperation attitude, a probit model of part 2 contributions is fitted. The result of the estimation is listed in Table 2. The table lists two estimations which sequentially add more explanatory variables. The first estimation (1) finds that neither treatment nor cooperation attitude, or it's interaction with treatment, are significant explanations

for the cooperation in part 2⁵. Estimation (2) adds belief (measured once in period 1) and an interaction term of belief and treatment, and finds neither of them to be significant explanations of the contributions in part 2. The only consistent finding in the two regressions is that contributions drop with repetition. This finding fits very well with the visual representation of the cooperation seen in figure 1.

Table 5 – Econometric analysis of cooperation in part 2 of the experiment

Dependent variable: Contribution part 2	(1)	(2)
Treatment	-0,172 (0,44)	-0,267 (0,48)
Cooperation attitude	0,051 (0,40)	0,059 (0,40)
Cooperation attitude x Treatment	0,247 (0,45)	0,067 (0,54)
Belief		0,221 (0,17)
Belief x Treatment		0,138 (0,31)
Period	-0.0736*** (0,01)	-0.0752*** (0,01)
Constant	0,351 (0,40)	0,091 (0,44)
Observations	780	780
Period	1-10	1-10
Pseudo r2	0,0259	0,0428
LR test	91,2	360,1
Prob<chi2	0	0

Note: Probit estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on session

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The main message to take away from the estimations in Table 2 is that the part 2 contribution behavior is not different across treatments, even when the regression controls for cooperation attitude and belief.

A final step in the analysis of the experimental result is to focus on the price development in the market treatment. As mentioned in the design section, **strong competition** in the market treatment is a requirement for comparing the behavior in the two treatments. Strong competition ensures that prices are equal to cost, and hence that contribution costs the same in the two treatments. In Figure 2, the average trading prices are depicted. The figure illustrates that average trading prices start out very close to the cost and rapidly reach the exact cost levels. From period 6, not the slightest deviation from the cost levels is

⁵ Both the treatment and cooperation attitude variable remain insignificant if they are the only explanatory variable considered (when period is still control variable).

observed. Thus, it can be concluded that the cost of making the public good contribution was the same in the two treatments.




Figure 2: Price development in the market treatment.

5. Concluding discussion

This paper found that emotions are significantly affected when social interaction decisions are moved into a market exchange context. Compared to pure social interaction decisions, this context entails lower positive (higher negative) emotions, and also less emotional response to others' social decisions.

These findings should be seen in the light of the great success of pro-social behavior in market contexts. Nowadays, consumers quite often support good causes at the same time as they purchase private goods. In contrast with the positive image that this combination of private good purchase and good cause support receives in the public debate (see for instance the Economist 2008), findings from this paper suggest that it has a dark side. Namely that people are less emotional positive and become more immune to others'

behavior under the market arrangement. So, market based provision of pro-social behavior is popular, perhaps because of the strong signal/image value, but it holds negative emotional consequences, which are not observed by only studying cooperation behavior.

The present experiment was merely designed to explore the emotional footprints, whereas cooperation behavior in the experiment was only the work horse of this analysis. Although no contribution difference was observed (assumable because of the crude binary cooperation measure) across the market and non-market contexts, it seems likely that the emotional consequence of cooperating in the market exchange could manifest itself in less cooperation. The fact that emotional states are associated with degree of pro-social behavior has been observed in previous studies (Cubitt 2011, Reuben and van Winden 2008). Thus, the emotional effect of cooperation in market exchanges, documented in this experiment, lead me to predict that, under normal cooperation settings, the degree of pro-social behavior in market context will be lower compared to non-market contexts.

The present results are also relevant on a societal level. Matthew Rabin (1993, p. 1283) writes on this topic “*Welfare economics should be concerned not only with the efficient allocation of material goods, but also with designing institutions such that people are happy about the way they interact with others*”. As a social planner ought to care for the well-being of a societies’ citizens, this paper suggest she/he should be careful when designing institutions which promote pro-social behavior via market exchange, because this might result in less positive emotions.

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Appendix A

See separate document with supplementary material, which is intended for online publication.